Aristotle\u27s Conception of Justice by Chroust, Anton-Hermann & Osborn, David L.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-1-1942
Aristotle's Conception of Justice
Anton-Hermann Chroust
David L. Osborn
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anton-Hermann Chroust & David L. Osborn, Aristotle's Conception of Justice, 17 Notre Dame L. Rev. 129 (1942).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol17/iss2/2
ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE
I
The term "just," as used by Aristotle,' has two separate
mdanings: 2 in its first meaning it is principally used to de-
scribe a conduct in agreement with the "law";' a conduct,
therefore, which conforms to an established, authoritative
rule of human conduct; in short, it is used to describe a con-
duct which conforms to whatever constitutes an authorita-
tive instrument of social and moral control.4 In this sense
Justice denotes a "moral disposition which renders men apt
to do just things and which causes them to act justly and to
wish what is just." ' It refers primarily to the application or
1 This article is based upon the text of the Nicomachean Ethics, which is
commonly regarded as the authoritative statement of Aristotle's ethical system. We
shall not enter into a discussion of the relationship of the Nicomachean Ethics
to the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia. W. Jaeger (Aristoteles, Grund-
legung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung, 1923) has put forth conclusive evi-
dence that the Eudemian Ethics constitute an earlier course of lectures, disprov-
ing thus the old thesis of L. Stengel (Ueber die unter dem Namen des Aristoteles
er haltenen ethischen Schrifter, in Abhandl. d. bayr. Akad. d. Wissensch., 1841)
which declares it the work of Aristotle's disciple Eudemos. The Magna Moralia,
on the other hand, is a much shorter treatise, probably compiled by a Peripatetic
and based chiefly on the Eudemian Ethics, but also on parts of the Nicomachean
Ethics. Arnim (Die drei Aristotelischen Ethiken, in: Sitzungsbericht d. Wiener
Akad. 202, 1924, 2d Abhand.), however, insists that the Magna Moralia is the
first genuine work on ethics by Aristotle. It is interesting to note that the books
V (that concerning Justice), VI and VII of the Nicomachean Ethics belong also
to the Eudemian Ethics. The MSS of the latter omit these books referring the
reader to the corresponding parts i4 -the Nicomachean Ethics. The fact that the
three mentioned books of the Nicomachean Ethics constitute a series of somewhat
independent and unrelated essays (particularly book V, which is not even men-
tioned in the list of topics contained in book U chapter vii of the Nicomachean
Ethics) led some to assume that these parts originally belonged to the Eudemian
Ethics and were afterwards included in the Nicomachean Ethics, the correspond-
ing parts of the Nicomachean Ethics probably having been lost. This view could
not, however, be maintained in the face of the fact that certain parts of the ac-
cepted Eudemian Ethics would demand a rather different treatment of the topics
of the doubtful books.
2 See, for instance, 1108 a 6 f. (quoted from "Aristotelis Opera, edit. Academia
Regla Borusica, Berlin, 1831, vol. II, page 1108, left hand column-a-line 6);
1130 a 15; 1130 b5 f.; 8f.
3 Cf. 1129 a 32. Since Homer and Hesiod, the term Justice denotes in its
wider sense conformity to an established authoritative law.
4 Cf. Aristotle, "Politica," 1287 a 18. The English term "norm" probably
comes closest to the Greek "nomos," but "nomos" means also what is right and
just by an established convention.
5 1129 a 6 f.
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observance of certain authoritative rules of human conduct
and should, consequently, rather be called the virtue of
"righteousness" or of "moral Justice" - a virtue ' displayed
towards others,7 a social virtue.8
In its second meaning ' Justice signifies Equality,'0 or, to
be exact, a "fair mean." " It is this second meaning of Jus-
tice - "Justice in the narrower sense" 12 in which we are
primarily interested, since it constitutes that concept by
means of which the law in action, and not merely the moral
conduct of man, can be more specifically evaluated. In order
to make clear the distinction between "Justice according to
an authoritative rule" and Equality, Aristotle states that a
person whose conduct is "unjust," who acts contrary to cer-
tain moral principles "8 and, therefore, lacks virtue, is not
necessarily unjust as far as the principle of Equality is con-
cerned:' 4 that is to say, "he need not be one who has or
claims more than his fair due." 15
Justice in the sense of Equality has to do with external
and commensurable things;' 6 it is concerned with the pro-
portionate ratio of commensurable goods.' 7 Thus, a "just"
wage is a wage proportionate to the type and amount of
labor invested; it is one which is neither too great nor too
little (disproportionate), but midway between the two ex-
tremes. Similarly, a just law is the ideal mean "8 between
the two extremes of defect and excess.' 9
6 It is possible that Aristotle took the notion of Justice as a basic virtue from
Plato and particularly from Plato's Republic.
7 1129 b 27; 34; 1130 a 12 f.; 1130 b 1; 20; 1129 b 32; 1130 a 2; 4; 8.
8 1130 a 3; 1129 b 26; 30 f.
9 1129 a 25; 1130 a 15; 22; 32 f.; 1130 b 6 f.; 8 f.
10 1129 a 34; 1130 b 9; 33; 1131 a 10 f.; 12; 13; 14; 15; 16.
11 See note 17.
12 See, for instance, 1130 a 23; 1130 b 2; 30.
Is 1130 a 18; 19; 30; 31.
', 11430 a 21; 24; 1129 b 3 f.
15 1129 a 33; 1129 b 10; 1130 a 26; 1133 b 31; 1134 a 4 ;7f.
16 1130 b 2; 1133 a 10 f., also 1119 b 26.
17 1129 a 3; 1130 b 2; 1133 a 9 f.; 20 f.
18 1108 a 6; 1130 a 9; 22; 1130 b 14; 1131 a 14; 1132 a 22 f.; 29; 1132 b 4.
'9 1108a7 f.; 1129b6 f.; 113-1]b11; 12; 32f.; 1133a9f.
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Justice or the "just" in the sense of moral virtue is deter-
mined by the authoritative rule or rules of human conduct,
while Justice in the sense of "proportionate fairness" is
founded on the principle of Equality. This parallelism 20 of
"moral Justice" and Equality raises many difficult questions,
particularly as regards the relation of these two terms. It is
not permissible to assume that Equality alone constitutes
the basis of all "legal Justice," since Aristotle himself makes
the definite assertion that the common welfare of a political-
ly organized society depends primarily upon "moral Jus-
tice," which alone preserves happiness. 2 Nor, on the other
hand, does "moral Justice," as a general virtue, hold a rank
superior to that of Equality.2 It cannot, therefore, be made
use of to define, modify, or complement the principle of
Equality.23
Aristotle explains the relation of "moral Justice" and
Equality by pointing out that Equality is related to "moral
Justice" in the same way as the part is related to the whole.24
Moral Justice and Equality are not two co-extensive terms.
In order to illustrate this particular relationship he adds
that not everything which runs counter to the notion of
"moral Justice" also runs- counter to the principle of Equal-
ity, while whatever runs counter to the principle of Equality
also runs counter to the notion of moral Justice.25 In other
words, every infraction of the principle of "Justice in the
narrower sense" 2 (Equality) constitutes an infraction of
the principle of "Justice in the wider sense" (moral Jus-
tice), while not every infraction of the principle of "moral
Justice" implies an infraction of the principle of Equality.
By this one might be led to believe that "Equality," as used
by Aristotle, is merely one particular moral concept among
20 Cf. 1129 a 31 f.
21 1129 b 18.
22 1130 a 14.
28 1129 a 31.
24 1130 b 11 f.
25 1130 b 12 f.
26 See, for instance, 1130 a 23; 1130 b 2; 30.
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others - a particular aspect of "general moral Justice."
Such is not the case, however, for Aristotle's very definition
of the term "Equality" 27 shows it to be a principle of the
most particular nature, and not merely a derivative aspect
of the principle of moral Justice.2" In fact, the principle of
Equality is essential to a complete understanding of the full
implication and significance of the principle of moral Jus-
tice; the more so, since it constitutes a vital part or element
of that principle 29 - namely, one form in which moral Jus-
tice is manifested 1o - while moral Justice as such expresses
the fullness of what is called "righteous" or "just." 31 Thus
we may say that the moral virtue called "Justice" is, in its
ultimate meaning and content, but the ideal coincidence of
human conduct with certain authoritative moral rules, while
Equality is one of the forms in which this virtue appears. 2
The principle of Equality not only creates a definite moral
criterion for the administration of human conduct, but also
becomes actual in and through the principle of moral Justice.
At the same time, the principle of moral Justice unfolds and
manifests itself in the different forms of Equality.
Only now are we able not only to appreciate Aristotle's
reasons for conceiving of two types of Justice 33 which,
though separate and distinct, are nevertheless grounded in
the same genus: 4 but also to understand why he makes two
separate inquiries into the nature of Justice. While there
exists but one universal concept of the "just," its implica-
tions can be fully understood only if we approach it simul-
taneously from two directions - from the direction of moral
Justice and from the direction of the principle of Equality.
The "just" is the same in both instances, although the par-
2 ' See, for instance, 1130 a 16 f.; 24.
28 1130 b 10 f.
29 1130 b 14.
30 1130 a 22 f. The vice of injustice is an infraction of the principles of moral
Justice, though of no other virtue.
31 Cf., for instance, 1130 b 22 f.
32 1129 b 17 f.
33 1139 a 25; 33; 1130 a8 f.; 14 f.; 1130 b Sf.; 18; 24.
34 1130 b 1.
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ticular forms in which Justice is administered or formulated
- the "modes" of Justice - are separate. For instance, if a
man displays certain vices, such as throwing away his shield
from cowardice or using vile language from bad temper, 5
one might assume that his actions were prompted by a wish
to avoid bearing his fair share of the burden of evil and thus,
since to aspire to a deficiency of proportionate evil is a viola-
tion of the principle of Equality, 6 that he had been guilty
of an "injustice in the narrower sense." But since these ex-
amples of "vice" are meant to describe a conduct motivated
primarily by cowardice, ill temper, and the like, and not so
much by the desire for disproportionate gain, 7 the prin-
ciple violated is seen to be that of moral Justice.
This illustration shows clearly that our moral evaluation
of an action depends upon our viewpoint; that is to say, upon
whether we examine such an action as regards its relation
to an authoritatively established rule of conduct, whether
we consider it in the light of its manifest effects upon others
and its particular motivation, or whether we evaluate it by
the criterion of whether it exceeds or falls short of that
"mean" 8 which is expressed by the principle of Equality "
and which is concerned with the proportionate ratio of com-
mensurable goods.4"
If we are dealing primarily with the full content of Law
and Justice, our main problem is that of discovering whether
Law and Justice coincide with the authoritative rules of
moral control. But if we are interested only in the manner
in which this Justice manifests itself; with how "just" ac-
tion differs from morally virtuous action, we are concerning
ourselves with the principle of Equality or "equitable fair-
ness." Thus "moral Justice" and Equality are seen to be
merely two different aspects of the same thing.
85 1130 a 17 f.
36 1108 a 6 f; 1129 a 10; 1131 a 17; 1132 b 3; 5.
37 1132 b 13.
38 See, for instance, 1130 a 9; 1130 b 14; 1131 b 14; 1132 a 2 f.
89 1131 a 17.
40 1129a3; 1130b2; 1133a9f.; 20f.
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Justice is a virtue - the most difficult of all virtues ._'
which differs from all other virtues in that it is displayed to-
wards others 42 and not towards oneself. 8 It is the most per-
fect virtue because it is the practice of perfect virtue;44 it
is a social virtue, for it involves a relationship with others,4"
and embodies the good of others, because it does what is to
the advantage of another.46 The virtue of moral Justice is on
equal footing with the other moral virtues, having as a basis
the same "inner attitude" or disp6sition which accounts for
a definite conduct; however, the disposition peculiar to Jus-
tice is qualified as a "teleological" attitude, since it is an at-
titude displayed towards others.47 The social nature of Jus-
tice in Aristotle belongs not only to the general virtue of
moral Justice, but also to the principle of Equality: that is
to say, to that kind of Justice which is displayed in the form
of "equitable fairness." 48 Equality, like moral Justice, is a
social virtue, and this social nature, common to both moral
Justice and Equality,49 furnishes further proof that they are
not two different virtues but merely two aspects of the same
virtue. Equality denotes "equitable fairness" in ones deal-
ings with others; it denotes a conduct towards others not
motivated by a desire to exceed or fall short of the "fair
mean." ' 0 Such conduct always presupposes an attitude
which is significant only when displayed towards another.
If, then, Justice and Equality differ from other virtues in be-
ing concerned with the well-being of a fellowman,5 only
the "citizen," the "social man," the member of a socially or-
ganized society, and not the morally virtuous man, deserves
41 1130 a 8.
42 1139 b 27; 32; 33; 35; 1130 a 2; 4; 7; 8; 13; 1130b 1.
48 1129 b 33; 1130 a 6.
44 1129 b 30 f.
45 1130 a 2.
46 1130a 3 f.
47 1130 a 13.
48 1131 b 11; 1132 b 32 f.; 1133 a 9 f.
49 1130 b 1.
50 1139 a 33; 1129 b 10.
51 1130 a 2 f.
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the predicate "just." 52 Thus the problem of Justice and
Equality is one of the "common good," " of the politically
organized " society and its welfare.
II
The distinction between "commutative Justice," and "dis-
tributive Justice" " is undoubtedly the best known and most
significant feature of what might be called Aristotle's "the-
ory of law." 56 It is erroneous, however, to assume that this
distinction actually constitutes the structural scheme under-
lying his "legal system," or that it was proposed as such by
Aristotle. While it is certainly true that the concepts of
"commutative Justice" and "distributive Justice" were
coined and treated by Aristotle,5 7 it must be acknowledged
on the strength of existing literary evidence that he never
seriously attempted to "schematize his legal theory" accord-
ing to the above-mentioned distinction, and that all such
schematizations are, in the last analysis, the product of later
interpretation and interpolation of his doctrine.
Equality, also called "Justice in the narrow (or special)
sense," 58 consists of two main phases, the first of which is
exhibited in the act of "distributing" 58 certain matters be-
tween two or more persons, or in adjusting " them to their
proper ratios. Every form of proportional adjustment in the
sense of Equality or "equitable fairness" has to deal not
only with the reciprocal claims of two or more persons, but
also with the persons making the claims. 0 The principle of
52 1130 b 29.
53 1130 b 26.
54 1129 b 19.
55 Several attempts have been made to prove "retaliatory Justice" also equiv-
alent to "distributive Justice" and "commutative Justice."
56 The problems of "distributive Justice" and "commutative Justice" are
treated in 1130 b 30; 1133 b 28.
57 The relevant Aristotelian text in the Nicomachean Ethics, it must be
admitted, is quite often puzzling, not so much in content as in structural articula-
tion.
58 1130 a 8 f.; 14 f.; 1130 b 6; 16; 18; 30; 1131 b 24.
58a See, in general, 1131 a 9 f.; 1131 b 9; 15.
59 1130 b 31; 1131 a 9 f.
60 1131 a 16.
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Justice and Equality, which for the purpose of comparison
always presupposes a duality, requires, therefore, at least
four different factors: namely, two conflicting claims and two
claiming persons.6 should these two persons be of unequal
rank they cannot be treated alike,6" for the principle of
Equality demands that only equals be treated equally.6" In
this sense Equality is always proportionate equality - that
is to say, it is a form of Justice which allots burdens accord-
ing to the individual's ability to carry them and accords sup-
port in amounts which vary with the needs of the individuals
- and is called "distributive Justice." 64
On the other hand, "commutative Justice," which consti-
tutes the second phase of the principle of Equality or "equi-
table fairness," is distinguished from "distributive Justice" 65
in so far as it ignores the rank of the persons involved.66 Thus
"commutative Justice" requires only two factors, since its
particular task is limited to the proportionate ratio between
two "goods" - labor and wage, damage and recovery, and
the like.
The problems raised by the concepts of "distributive Jus-
tice" and "commutative Justice" do not originate with the
moral virtue of righteousness, but stem rather from the con-
cept of Equality or "equitable fairness." To Aristotle, Equal-
ity is not only the basic form in which the authoritative rules
of human conduct are unfolded and made manifest, but con-
stitutes also the main topic of his investigation into the na-
ture of "legal Justice." The problems of "distributive Jus-
tice" and "commutative Justice" are in fact incidental to his
investigations into the nature of Equality, and are treated,
along with other problems, as arising from that principle.
61 1131 a 19; 32; 1131 b 4; see also "Politica" 1120 a 11 f.
62 1131 a 22.
63 Cf. "Politica" 1280 a 11 f.
64 From all this it follows that the "retaliatory Justice" is but part of the
"distributive Justice" (or "proportionate Justice"), since retaliation is not mere-
ly giving "tit for tat" but an act rewarding a person. See, for instance, 1132 b 30.
65 1131 b 27; 1132 a 1.
66 1132 a S.
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Thus we cannot say that he created the principle of Equality
in order to answer the questions raised by the notions of
"distributive Justice" or "commutative Justice." "
The fundamental distinction between "distributive Jus-
tice" and "commutative Justice" is to be found in the dis-
tinction between Equality with regard to the persons in-
volved and Equality without regard to the person; between
the notion that the same treatment applies to everyone and
the notion that everyone should have his due according to
his worth. This also furnishes the basis for Aristotle's divi-
sion of "particular" Justice into "strict equality" and "pro-
portionate equality." 8
Only by reducing the form in which the law operates to the
principle of Equality may law and Justice become a rational
object of human understanding, an object of scientific in-
quiry. The application of law and Justice thus becomes not
only predictable, but also its very existence can be proven;
the more so, since Equality (and therefore Justice) as a
problem of ratios is based on mathematics.69 The mathe-
matical method which subtends "distributive Justice," or
"proportionate Justice," 7" is, however, different from that
which is applied in "commutative Justice," in that the former
always presupposes four, and the latter but two, terms.
71
The Justice of "strict Equality" rests upon a principle which
-treats the persons involved as absolute equals.72 Here it
makes no difference "whether a good man has defrauded a
bad man or a bad man a good one; the law looks only at the
nature of the damage, treating the parties as equal, and ask-
ing merely whether one has done and the other suffered in-
justice: hence the unjust being here the unequal, the judge
endeavors to equalize it." " The Judge, in considering mere-
67 1132 a 17 f.
68 1131 b 10 f.; 1132 32 f.; 1133 a 9 f.
69 1131 a 31.
70 1131 a 29.
71 1131 a 19; 32; 1,131 b 4; 1132 a 17 f.
72 1132 a 2 f.; 5.
78 1132a2f.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ly the relative worth of different claims, restores Equality "
by taking away from the party holding an excessive advan-
tage half of the amount by which his share exceeds that of
the party in defect and adding it to the share of the party
holding the lesser advantage. 5 The equal is here a mean by
way of a purely arithmetical ratio between excess and de-
fect,7 6 for "the just in private transactions, although in a
sense Equality, is equality according to arithmetical propor-
tions." 11 Justice thus achieved is Equality "analogous to
arithmetical proportions." 78
The actualization of the principle of "distributive Jus-
tice," which deals with the "equitable mean" of at least four
contributing factors -2' that is to say, which takes into ac-
count the worth, not only of the two claims, but also of the
two claimants - proceeds according to geometrical propor-
tions.8 o Equality in this sense "involves ...not only (a)
that the just is a mean and equal, and relative to something
and just for certain persons, but also (b) that, as a mean,
it implies certain extremes between which it lies, namely ex-
cess and defect; (c) that, as equality, it implies two shares
that are equal; and (d) that, as just, it implies certain per-
sons for whom it is just. It follows therefore that Justice (in
the sense of "proportionate equality") involves at least
four terms, namely two persons for whom it is just and two
shares which are just. And there will be the same Equality
between the shares as between the persons, since the ratio
between the shares will be equal to the ratio between the
persons; for if the persons are not equal, they will not have
74 1132 a 25.
75 1132 a 24 f.: "Now the judge restores equality: if we represent the matter
by a line divided into two unequal parts, he takes away from the greater segment
that portion by which it exceeds one-half of the whole line, and adds it to the
lesser segment."'
76 1132 a 29; 1131 2 17; 1132 b 3; S.
77 1131 b 32 f.
78 1132 a 30. Note that we do not call this a proportion at all.
79 1131-a 19; 32; 1131 b 4.
80 1131 b 13 f. It might be possible that Aristotle borrowed the notion of
Equality according to geometrical proportions from Plato. Cf., for instance
"Gorgias" 507 e, 508 a; the "Laws" 757.
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equal shares." " "When the persons are omitted, then men
judge erroneously. The reason is that they are passing judg-
ment on themselves, and most people are bad judges in
their own case." 82 The so-called "geometrical equation" in-
cludes among its four terms the difference of the persons or
parties involved and does not limit itself to the shares, as
does the arithmetical or algebraic method employed by "com-
mutative Justice." In order to maintain the inner consis-
tency of the "geometrical equation," two of its four terms
must be commensurate; 8 that is to say, one of the terms
pertaining to the ratio of the shares or goods must be com-
mensurate with one term pertaining to the ratio of the two
persons.8" Aristotle explains the need of a dual method in
establishing Justice and Equality - the need of a "com-
mutative Justice" side by side with a "distributive Justice"
- by pointing out that "where equals possess or are allotted
unequal shares, or persons not equal, equal shares, quarrels
and complaints arise." 5
The inequality of men rests, accbrding to Aristotle, upon
the fact that men themselves are of different value or
"worth." 86 This difference in man's value 87 becomes an es-
sential element of "distributive Justice." 88 "Commutative
Justice," on the other hand, entirely ignores the individual
worth, "dignity," or standing of the parties involved. For
instance, any barter of economic goods is exclusively con-
cerned with the quality and quantity of these goods - with
the balance or equality in the exchange of them. 9
81 1131 a 15-24.
82 "Politica" 1280 a 18 f.
85 1131 a 33-The Aristotelian "continuous proportion" means one in which
the two ratios have a factor in common.
84 Aristotle is fully aware that any attempt to reduce to one common term
two such basically different things as the value of a person and the value of a
share will have to contend with almost insurmountable difficulties. See, for instance,
1133 b 19; "Politica" 1280 a 18. "Alike persons ...acknowledge the equality of
things, but dispute about the merits of a person." Cf. also 1129 b 33 f.
85 1134 a 24.
88 1131 a 24.
87 1131 a 27.
88 1131 a 25.
89 1133 a 14 f.
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To define the nature of the Aristotelian notion of human
worth is extremely difficult, since Aristotle conceives of hu-
man worth or dignity as a factor which varies, particularly
with variations in the form of government.90 It depends pri-
marily, at any rate, upon the social ideals of the government
in power. " Thus the notion of "distributive Justice," which
always operates wfth the worth of man as a factor, turns into
a problem of what might be called "public law" or "public
policy." Everything that is "distributed" or "allocated" by
the government in the form of proportionate burdens or
"goods" constitutes a public or "common good" 9' - that
is to say, a matter of universal concern.
We have thus gained another means-of distinguishing be-
tween "commutative Justice" and "distributive Justice"; the
former being always the Justice of the "private law" or the
"voluntary transaction," 9' while the latter constitutes the
justice of the "public law." "Commutative Justice" is the
"Justice of co-ordination," since the two parties involved
face each other as equals. "Distributive Justice," on the other
hand, denotes the "Justice of subordination," since there
must be one authority which distributes Justice; one which
allocates advantages or disadvantages, and which, conse-
quently, must be above the two claimants. This becomes par-
ticularly apparent in Aristotle's treatment of the conse-
quences of punishable acts.92 Every crime, every act causing
distress and suffering, disturbs that balance which, as the
essence of the principle of Equality, forms the basis of all
"corrective" or "retaliatory" Justice. Hence it is the effort
of the judge (or the court) in dealing with such an act to re-
store equality by the different penalties or losses he imposes
90 1131 a 27. Aristotle implies that such advantages as nobility, wealth, free-
dom, etc., depend largely upon the kind of government in power.
90 1131 a 27 f.
91 1131 a 28.
910 1131 a 2; 3; 4; 5.
92 1132 a 9.
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- by taking away the "gain." 13 The corrective function of
the judge in this case must be understood in terms of a con-
tract between two parties, for it is the restoration of a bal-
ance upset by the "gain" of the criminal and "loss" of the
victim 91 which constitutes the essence of "corrective Jus-
tice." From all this it would seem to follow that simple
reciprocity " describes best the nature of Justice, particu-
larly that of "corrective Justice," and that the "arithmet-
ical" method is the only way to bring about Equality. But
Aristotle himself admits that strict reciprocity does not fully
coincide with the principle of "distributive Justice" or "cor-
rective Justice" 96 (itself a form of "distributive Justice").
In many cases "reciprocity is at variance with the idea of
Justice: for example, if an officer strikes a man, it is wrong
for the man to strike him back; and if a man strikes an
officer, it is not enough for the officer to strike him, but he
must be punished as well." "' The difference in the rank of
the persons involved in this exchange of blows plays an im-
portant part in establishing Justice and Equality. The policy
of strict reciprocity, of "absolute Equality" cannot restore
the balance disturbed by one party if the other is of differ-
ent rank or "worth." Thus, in the case of the officer who is
struck by an ordinary citizen, the law, in order to restore
Equality, must not merely take away from one of the in-
volved persons half of his excessive advantage and add it to
the defect of the other; it must impose additional punish-
93 1132 a' 6 f., 9; 10: "For the term 'gain' is used in a general manner to
apply to such cases, even though it is not strictly appropriate -to some of them,
for example to a person who strikes another, nor is 'loss' appropriate to the
victim in this case; but at all events the results are called 'loss' and 'gain' re-
spectively when -the amount of the damage sustained comes to be estimated."
94 1132 a 14 f. Cf. also 1132 b 11 f.: "The terms 'loss' and 'gain' in these
cases are borrowed from the operations of voluntary exchange."
95 1132 b 21.
96 1132 b 25.
97 1132 b 28 f.
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ment9 Aristotle remarks in this connection that punish-
ment and "corrective Justice" - in other words "propor-
tionate retribution" - is the bond which holds together any
politically organized society, since the very existence of such
a society depends on proportionate reciprocity. 9
"Corrective Justice," as one form of "distributive Jus-
tice," operates with reference to the status of the different
persons involved. "Cummutative Justice," or "private law
Justice," on the other hand, ignores the worth and rank of
the persons. Any punishment imposed by the courts is aimed
at restoration of balance through the principle of "propor-
tionate Equality." There exist two kinds of Equality (or
Justice): namely, "strict Equality" and "proportionate
Equality," for there are certain claims which can only be
adjusted by the application of the principle of "strict Jus-
tice" and Equality, while certain others require in their ad-
justment the application of the principle of "proportionate
Justice" and Equality. The difference in the administration
of Justice in these matters is, however, not the result of the
difference between simple and proportionate Justice or
Equality. The different legal problems arising from the con-
duct of human life are themselves responsible for the two
different kinds of Equality and Justice. Thus it might very
well be possible for one conduct to involve questions per-
taining to "strict Justice" as well as to "proportionate Jus-
tice." This difference in the administration of Justice is,
however, not identical with the difference that exists be-
tween the general moral virtue of Justice and "Justice in
the narrower sense," since it is neither simply a question of
dualism of form and content, nor a problem of the particular
98 1132 b 30. It has been said that the Aristotelian term "punishment," by
meats of which Equality should be restored, really suggests what we would call
a fine, since a fine, rather than general punishment, would serve to balance gain
and loss. This "Punishment" is, in the last analysis, part of the recovery for dam-
ages arising from tort.
99 1132 b 33 .
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standpoint. "Strict Justice" and "proportionate Justice"
are, in the last analysis, merely two.separate processes of
which neither could be called superior to the other, since
the choice of the kind of Justice to be applied is always de-
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